|MCI WCOM / Sprint Merger|
On November 17, 1999, MCI WorldCom, Inc. (MCI WorldCom) and Sprint Corporation (Sprint) filed joint applications under Sections 214 and 310(d) of the Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. §§ 214 and 310(d), requesting Commission approval of the transfer of control to MCI WorldCom of licenses and authorizations controlled or requested by Sprint or its affiliates or subsidiaries. This transfer of control would take place as the result of a proposed merger agreement whereby Sprint will be merged with and into MCI WorldCom. Upon merger closing, the separate corporate existence of Sprint will cease to exist and the present wholly-owned subsidiaries of Sprint that hold Section 214 authorizations, cable landing licenses and/or radio licenses will become wholly-owned subsidiaries of the merged company, which will be named WorldCom.
MCI WorldCom and Sprint submit that the proposed merger is likely to produce benefits in the markets for local and long distance, voice and data, narrowband and broadband, and wireline and wireless services. They further assert that the proposed merger will serve the public interest and will not produce anti-competitive effects in any telecommunications market. Moreover, MCI WorldCom and Sprint state that they will work cooperatively with policymakers to address and resolve possible concerns regarding Sprint's Internet backbone business.
US DOJ Complaint: USA v. MCI & Sprint (June 26, 2000)
A. Relevant Product Market
- The Internet is a vital conduit for commerce and communication for millions of Americans, and it is fast becoming as much a part of daily life as the television and the telephone. This global network of public and private networks, i.e., the Internet, enables end users to communicate with each other and access large amounts of information, data, and educational and entertainment services. Until April 30, 1995, the Internet was administered by the National Science Foundation ("NSF"), an independent federal agency. Thereafter, the NSF relinquished its role, which allowed the development of the current commercial Internet to occur.
- The end users of the Internet -- individuals, business customers, content providers, governments, and universities -- obtain access either through a "dial-up" modem or other consumer Internet access connection (e.g., cable modem or digital subscriber line service), or through a dedicated high-speed facility accessing the Internet ("dedicated access") through one of thousands of Internet service providers ("ISPs"). ISPs provide access to the Internet on a local, regional, or national basis. ISPs operate their own networks of varying size, but most have limited facilities.
- An ISP can connect any customer on its network to any of the other customers on its network. In order to allow its customers to communicate with the many end users connected to other networks, however, an ISP must establish direct or indirect interconnections with those other networks. Because the Internet comprises thousands of separate networks, direct interconnections between each of those networks and all other networks would be impractical. Instead, the Internet has developed a hierarchical structure, in which smaller networks are interconnected with one of a few large Internet "backbone" networks, which operate high-capacity long-haul transmission facilities and are interconnected with each other. In a typical Internet communication, for example, an ISP sends data from one of its customers to the large network that the ISP uses for backbone services, which in turn sends the data to another backbone network, which then delivers it to the ISP serving the end user to whom the data is addressed.
- Internet backbone providers ("IBPs") and ISPs can generally exchange traffic directly through one of two interconnection arrangements: "transit" or "peering." Through "transit" service, an ISP, small IBP, or other corporate customer purchases a dedicated access facility linking it directly to the transit provider's Internet backbone network. That transit service provides the purchaser full Internet connectivity, i.e., the ability to send and receive traffic through the purchaser's IBP to any other network or destination on the Internet. Under a transit arrangement, the customer pays a fee for the connection in addition to the fee paid for transit service. A transit provider does not pay any fee for access to its transit customers' networks.
- Networks, including IBPs and ISPs, may also exchange traffic with other networks through "peering" arrangements whereby each "peer" will only accept traffic that is destined either for its own network or for one of its own transit customers. Peers do not accept traffic destined for non-customer networks, i.e., transit traffic. Unlike transit, peering is typically a settlement-free, or "bill and keep," arrangement under which neither party pays the other for terminating traffic. Each peer typically pays for one half the cost of the connections between their networks.
- Interconnection arrangements between networks are voluntary and consensual in nature, and are not subject to governmental regulation. Internet networks exchange traffic either at private interconnection sites or at public interconnection sites known as Network Access Points ("NAPs") or Metropolitan Area Exchanges ("MAEs"). The NSF established the first public interconnection facilities, which were to be operated by private parties, to enable any two ISPs or IBPs who chose to peer with each other to do so at a NAP or MAE. UUNET operates three of the largest and busiest public interconnection points (MAE-East, MAE-West, and MAE-Central) and four smaller regional MAEs. Similarly, Sprint operates another of the busiest NAPs that is located in the New York City area in Pennsauken, New Jersey. Together, the Defendants will control four of the seven primary public interconnection points.
- The explosive growth of the Internet overwhelmed these NAPs and MAEs, and despite the addition of new public access points to accommodate this growth, the public interconnection facilities remain chronically congested. In an effort to avoid these congested facilities, some networks have established private bilateral interconnection facilities with their peers. Today, large IBPs exchange most of their traffic with other IBPs at private interconnection sites at various points throughout their networks. Many smaller networks, however, still rely solely or substantially upon public access points. These networks have been unable to provide high-quality Internet access to their customers.
- There are a small number of large, powerful IBPs -- referred to as "Tier 1" IBPs -- that sell transit service to substantial numbers of ISPs and sell dedicated Internet access directly to corporate customers or other enterprises. Tier 1 IBPs have large nationwide or international networks capable of transporting large volumes of data. These Tier 1 IBPs typically maintain private peering relationships with all other Tier 1 IBPs on a settlement-free basis, as opposed to purchasing Internet connectivity (e.g., transit) from any other IBP. Most Internet communications are carried over the networks of these Tier 1 IBPs, and either originated or terminated, or both, with end users that obtain Internet access directly from a Tier 1 IBP, or from an ISP or other network that purchases transit from a Tier 1 IBP (i.e., a Tier 1 IBP's customer).
- Smaller IBPs, often referred to as "Tier 2" or "Tier 3" IBPs, may also sell transit to smaller ISPs or IBPs and sell dedicated Internet access to end users. However, these Tier 2 or Tier 3 IBPs typically purchase transit from (rather than peer with) one or more Tier 1 IBPs, and/or rely substantially upon exchanging traffic at the inferior public interconnection facilities. Lower-tier IBPs that must purchase a significant amount of connectivity from other IBPs operate at substantial cost disadvantages compared to Tier 1 IBPs, which rely exclusively on peering.
- Tier 1 IBPs also have significant competitive advantages compared to lower tier IBPs in terms of their ability to provide higher-quality service through their direct and private interconnections, rather than relying on indirect transit service or on the inferior and congested public interconnection points. Generally, network operators seek the most direct routing for their Internet communications -- i.e., over routes with the fewest possible number of cross-network connections or "hops" -- because of the greater risk that data will be lost or its transmission delayed as the number of interconnection points increases. Lower-tier IBPs that must rely on transit typically reach other networks indirectly through their transit provider's network, adding "hops." Because Tier 1 IBPs provide direct connections to large numbers of ISPs and to other Tier 1 IBPs that collectively handle most Internet traffic, Tier 1 IBPs can offer higher quality services than can lower-tier IBPs. Many important ISPs and business customers will not purchase Internet connectivity from an IBP unless that IBP maintains direct, private peering connections with most, if not all, Tier 1 IBPs.
- Because of these differences, the provision of Tier 1 backbone services is distinguished from that provided by other IBPs. Typically, Tier 1 IBPs charge higher prices for Internet access than do lower-tier IBPs because they offer distinct value to their customers and are not significantly constrained by the competition of lower-tier IBPs. The provision of connectivity to Tier 1 IBPs is a line of commerce and a relevant product market for purposes of Section 7 of the Clayton Act. There are no substitutes for this connectivity sufficiently close to defeat or discipline a small but significant nontransitory increase in price.
B. Relevant Geographic Market
- Tier 1 IBPs provide connectivity to their networks throughout the United States. Because providing customers with Tier 1 IBP connectivity in the United States requires domestic operations, such customers are unlikely to turn to any foreign providers that lack these domestic operations in response to a small but significant and nontransitory increase in price by domestic Tier 1 IBPs. The United States is the relevant geographic market for purposes of Section 7 of the Clayton Act.
C. Market Concentration and Anticompetitive Effects
- WorldCom's wholly owned subsidiary, UUNET, is by far the largest Tier 1 IBP by any relevant measure and is already approaching a dominant position in the Internet backbone market. Based upon a study conducted in February 2000, UUNET's share of all Internet traffic sent to or received from the customers of the 15 largest Internet backbones in the United States was 37%, more than twice the share of Sprint, the next-largest Tier 1 IBP, which had a 16% share. These 15 backbones represent approximately 95% of all U.S. dedicated Internet access revenues. UUNET's and Sprint's 53% combined share of Internet traffic is at least five times larger than that of the next-largest IBP. The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index ("HHI"), the standard measure of market concentration (defined and explained in Appendix A), indicates that this market is highly concentrated. The HHI in terms of traffic is approximately 1850; post-merger, the HHI will rise approximately 1150 points to approximately 3000. (Note: Throughout the Complaint, market share percentages have been rounded to the nearest whole number, but HHIs have been estimated using unrounded percentages in order to accurately reflect the concentration of the various markets.)
- The proposed merger threatens to destroy the competitive environment that has created a vibrant, innovative Internet by forming an entity that is larger than all other IBPs combined, and thereby has an overwhelmingly disproportionate size advantage over any other IBP.
- The proposed transaction would produce anticompetitive harm in at least two ways. First, it would substantially lessen competition by eliminating Sprint, the second-largest IBP in an already concentrated market, as a competitive constraint on the Internet backbone market. The elimination of this constraint will provide the combined entity with the incentive and ability to charge higher prices and provide lower quality of service for customers.
- Second, the combined entity ("UUNET/Sprint") will have the incentive and ability to impair the ability of its rivals to compete by, among other things, raising its rivals' costs and/or degrading the quality of its interconnections to its rivals. As a result of the merger, UUNET/Sprint's rivals will become increasingly dependent upon being connected to the combined entity, and the combined entity will exploit that advantage. Such behavior will likely enhance the market power of the combined firm, and ultimately facilitate a "tipping" of the Internet backbone market that will result in a monopoly.
- As is true in network industries generally, the value of Internet access to end users becomes greater as more and more end users can easily be reached through the Internet. The benefit that one end user derives from being able to communicate effectively with additional users is known as a "network externality."
- When the networks that constitute the Internet operate in a competitive market, this network externality creates powerful incentives for each individual network to seek and implement efficient interconnection arrangements with other networks. Efficient interconnection has many requirements, including the physical connection to exchange traffic and the effective implementation of cross-network protocols or standards. For example, providers in competitive network industries have strong incentives to cooperate in the development of new cross-network protocols or quality of service ("QoS") standards that would enable new services or applications to be used across interconnection points on multiple providers' networks. By securing efficient interconnection, an ISP or IBP makes its services more valuable to its existing and potential customers. End users can enjoy the benefits of network externalities regardless of which network they belong to so long as their cross-network communications are of similar quality to communications "on-net," or purely within their provider's network. Thus, a failure to secure efficient interconnection arrangements places any given network at a significant competitive disadvantage when such customers can turn to a competing network that is efficiently interconnected to other networks.
- The explosive growth of Internet traffic, which has been doubling in volume every three to four months, and the introduction of new applications that depend upon the transmission of large quantities of data, have made it necessary for IBPs to constantly increase the capacity, i.e., bandwidth, of their own networks, and of the facilities through which they interconnect with other networks. A network that upgrades bandwidth within its own network in an adequate and timely manner can maintain the quality of its customers' Internet experience with regard to communications that originate as well as terminate on that network. In order to maintain the quality of its customers' Internet experience with regard to communications that originate or terminate on another network, however, a network must constantly upgrade the capacity of its interconnections with other networks, as well as upgrade capacity within its own network.
- Any failure to keep pace with the growing demand for increased interconnection capacity -- or, worse yet, any degradation in the quality of existing interconnections with other networks -- would adversely affect the quality of an Internet user's experience regardless of the capacity and efficiency of an IBP's own network. Due to the Internet's growth rate, any failure to make adequate and timely upgrades of interconnection capacity is tantamount to a degradation of the quality of interconnection. When networks operate in competitive markets, they have mutual incentives to avoid such degradation.
- Similarly, when operating in competitive markets, networks have incentives to negotiate reasonable prices for interconnection arrangements. An IBP that sells transit to another network will have incentives to charge reasonable prices for that service in order to prevent a transit customer from taking its business to a rival IBP. Furthermore, two networks will have incentives to enter into peering arrangements when, for each, the cost of terminating the other's traffic is roughly comparable to the benefit of having its own traffic terminated by the other, taking into account, among other factors, whether the networks have comparable traffic levels, similar geographic scope, and a roughly comparable input/output ratio at each interconnection point. As long as there are a sufficient number of Tier 1 IBPs of roughly comparable size, there exist sufficient incentives for all Tier 1 IBPs to peer privately with each other at the necessary capacity levels. In turn, this enhances both Internet connectivity and competition among Tier 1 IBPs. Nevertheless, an IBP makes peering decisions on a discretionary basis, and may refuse to peer or may terminate a peering relationship with any other IBP on short notice or without cause if it determines that doing so is in its self-interest.
- When a single network grows to a point at which it controls a substantial share of the total Internet end user base and its size greatly exceeds that of any other network, network externalities may cause a reversal of its previous incentives to achieve efficient interconnection arrangements with its rival networks. In this context, degrading the quality or increasing the price of interconnection with smaller networks can create advantages for the largest network in attracting customers to its network. Customers recognize that they can communicate more effectively with a larger number of other end users if they are on the largest network, and this effect feeds upon itself and becomes more powerful as larger numbers of customers choose the largest network. This effect has been described as "tipping" the market. Once the market begins to "tip," connecting to the dominant network becomes even more important to competitors. This, in turn, enables the dominant network to further raise its rivals' costs, thereby accelerating the tipping effect. As a result of an increase in their costs, rivals may not be able to compete on a long-term basis and may exit the market. If rivals decide to pass on these costs, users of connectivity will respond by selecting the dominant network as their provider. Ultimately, once rivals have been eliminated or reduced to "customer status," the dominant network can raise prices to users of its own network beyond competitive levels. Once this occurs, restoring the market to a competitive state often requires extraordinary means, including some form of government regulation.
- If the merger is allowed to proceed, the Defendants will be in a commanding position vis-à-vis all of their Tier 1 IBP rivals. With a majority of all Internet traffic on its own network, UUNET/Sprint and its customers will derive relatively less benefit from being efficiently connected to smaller networks than will the customers of these smaller networks derive from being efficiently connected to UUNET/Sprint. Whereas in a competitive environment Tier 1 IBPs have roughly equal incentives to peer with each other, the merged entity will be so large relative to any other IBP that its interest in providing others efficient and mutually beneficial access to its network will diminish. Because other Tier 1 IBPs will have a relatively greater need to be connected to UUNET/Sprint, in the absence of a peering relationship, they will be forced to purchase transit services from UUNET/Sprint to maintain adequate interconnection capacity.
- Whereas in a competitive environment Tier 1 IBPs have incentives to charge reasonable prices for transit, the merged entity will be so large relative to other IBPs that its interest in providing reasonable prices or terms for transit service will diminish. Ultimately, there is a significant risk that, as a result of the merger, the combined entity will be able to "tip" the Internet backbone services market and raise prices for all dedicated access services.
- The proposed transaction will substantially enhance the risk that UUNET/Sprint will have the power to engage in anticompetitive behavior. Such behavior may involve refusing to peer with other Tier 1 IBPs for interconnection, and either failing to augment (e.g., by denying, withholding, or "slow-rolling" requested upgrades) or otherwise degrading the quality of interconnection capacity between peers.
- The Defendants already require both their transit customers and peers to enter into strict nondisclosure agreements ("NDAs") as a condition of doing business. The NDAs prohibit these customers and peers from disclosing the nature or existence of the interconnection agreements and, in the case of customers, the prices charged. By enforcing secrecy, these NDAs will enhance the Defendants' ability to price discriminate (i.e., charge different prices) among their customers and to grant or deny peering on an arbitrary basis.
- Another way in which a combined UUNET/Sprint will be able to limit rivals' abilities to compete will be by refusing to cooperate with other Tier 1 IBPs in implementing interconnection arrangements required for the development of new Internet-based services, such as voice over Internet protocol ("VoIP"), video conferencing, live video transmission, or Internet protocol virtual private networks ("IP/VPNs"). These new services are becoming increasingly important to Internet users and require specialized arrangements for effective transmission across two or more backbone networks. For example, cross-network QoS standards that are required for two individual networks to share in providing certain Internet-based services have not yet been adopted on an industry-wide basis. UUNET/Sprint will be able to take advantage of its size to enhance its market power by implementing a QoS standard "on net" while refusing to cooperate in the implementation of cross-network QoS standards. Because UUNET/Sprint will have such a large percentage of traffic on net, customers seeking to use these services over as much of the Internet as possible will have little choice but to migrate to or select it as their provider. UUNET/Sprint will also have the incentive and ability to exploit its unmatched scale and scope to control the development of these new services so that only its own customers will have access to them.
- Entry into the Tier 1 Internet backbone services market would not be timely, likely, or sufficient to remedy the proposed merger's likely anticompetitive harm. In the current market environment, entry barriers are already high, and the proposed transaction will substantially raise barriers to entry. An entrant into the Tier 1 Internet backbone market must establish and maintain adequate peering interconnections to provide Internet connectivity. Entry into the Tier 1 Internet backbone market requires that an IBP peer privately, on a settlement-free basis, with all other Tier 1 IBPs, as well as interconnect with other IBPs without having to purchase any significant amount of Internet connectivity. Incumbent Tier 1 IBPs only grudgingly grant private peering to another IBP when it has a sufficiently large customer base such that other Tier 1 IBPs will be able to derive sufficient positive network externalities from interconnection with it. In a classic "Catch-22," without adequate peering interconnections a rival cannot gain customer traffic and without sufficient customer traffic a rival cannot gain peering connections.
- UUNET/Sprint would be able to control and inhibit successful entry by refusing to interconnect with new entrants or by limiting those connections in order to control the growth of its rivals. By degrading the quality of interconnection and raising its rivals' costs, UUNET/Sprint would further prevent entry and expansion by other IBPs. Moreover, through its control of public interconnection facilities (e.g., MAE-East, MAE-West, New York NAP) and its refusal to upgrade these facilities, UUNET/Sprint would be able to limit opportunities for existing rivals and new entrants to build their traffic volumes through public peering.
- Entry into the Tier 1 Internet backbone services market also requires substantial time and enormous sums of capital to build a network of sufficient size and capacity, and to attract and retain the scarce, highly skilled technical personnel required for its operations.
Government Activity FCC's WCOM Sprint Webpage
- Statement by Joel I. Klein on the Abandonment of the WorldCom/Sprint Transaction (7/12/00)
- WCOM Press Release: July 13, 2000 WORLDCOM, SPRINT TERMINATE MERGER AGREEMENT
- SPRINT STATEMENT ON TERMINATION OF MERGER WITH WORLDCOM Kansas City, Mo., July 13, 2000
DOJ has announced that it will file suit to block this merger and the EU has likewise indicated that it is unlikely to go through. The withdrawal of the WCOM / Spring merger application was approved on August 3.
Merger proceeding raises concern of merging the largest Internet backbone provider with another of the largest providers. MCI WorldCom is the owner of UUNet and the owner of the major backbone peering points known as the MAEs, in particular MAE East and MAE West where a tremendous amount of backbone traffic is exchanged. Concern for consolidation and potential anti-competitive affect on the market. One option in order to permit the merger to go through reportedly is for Sprint to divest itself of its Internet backbone services.
From the FCC Public Notice:
"On November 17, 1999, MCI WorldCom, Inc. (MCI WorldCom) and Sprint Corporation (Sprint) filed joint applications under Sections 214 and 310(d) of the Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. §§ 214 and 310(d), requesting Commission approval of the transfer of control to MCI WorldCom of licenses and authorizations controlled or requested by Sprint or its affiliates or subsidiaries. This transfer of control would take place as the result of a proposed merger agreement whereby Sprint will be merged with and into MCI WorldCom. Upon merger closing, the separate corporate existence of Sprint will cease to exist and the present wholly-owned subsidiaries of Sprint that hold Section 214 authorizations, cable landing licenses and/or radio licenses will become wholly-owned subsidiaries of the merged company, which will be named WorldCom.
"MCI WorldCom and Sprint submit that the proposed merger is likely to produce benefits in the markets for local and long distance, voice and data, narrowband and broadband, and wireline and wireless services. They further assert that the proposed merger will serve the public interest and will not produce anti-competitive effects in any telecommunications market. Moreover, MCI WorldCom and Sprint state that they will work cooperatively with policymakers to address and resolve possible concerns regarding Sprint's Internet backbone business.
© Cybertelecom ::
11/17/99 Application of Sprint and MCI WorldCom for Consent to Transfer Control of Corporations Holding Commission Licenses and Authorizations Pursuant to Sections 214 and 310(d) of the Communications Act.
[ Pages 1-29 | Pages 30-59 | Pages 60-76 | Pages 77-114 ]
Exhibit 1 - Includes MCI WorldCom Local Facilities, MMDS Assigned Frequencies, MMDS PSA and BTA Map; Exhibit A Declaration of Daniel Kelley and Robert Mercer
Resumes - Daniel Kelley and Robert Mercer
Appendix-B part 1 - Includes Declaration of Stanley M. Besen & Stephen R. Brenner
Appendix-B, part 2 - Includes Besen & Brenner Resumes
Appendices C-E - Includes Affidavit of John G. Donoghue (Appendix C), Afficavit of Sunit Patel (Appendix D), Joint Affidavit of Wayne Rehberger & K. William Grothe, Jr.(Appendix E)
[ Merger Plan, part 1 | Merger Plan, part 2 ]
Supplemental Information - submitted 1/14/00 - Additional Information Requested by the FCC Including a Description of Internet Services Provided, and an Assessment of the Public Interest Impact of the Merger on the Market for these Services.
1/14/00 Additional Information Requested by the FCC as Submitted by MCI WorldCom and Sprint Including a Description of Internet Services Provided, and an Assessment of the Public Interest Impact of the Merger on the Market for these Services.
Released: 11/20/2001. COMMON CARRIER, INTERNATIONAL, AND WIRELESS TELECOMMUNICATIONS BUREAUS MODIFY WORLDCOM-INTERMEDIA MERGER CONDITIONS. (DA No. 01-2727). CCB. Contact: Henry L. Thaggert at 7941,
COMMISSION SEEKS COMMENT ON JOINT APPLICATIONS FOR CONSENT TO TRANSFER CONTROL FILED BY MCI WORLDCOM, INC. AND SPRINT CORPORATION. (DA No. 00-104). Dkt No.: CC- 99-333. Public Notice (Word) Released: January 19, 2000.
SPRINT CORPORATION/MCI WORLDCOM, INC. Granted WorldCom's and Sprint's
request to withdraw its application in CC Docket 99-333. Dkt No.: CC-99-333. Action by Chief, Policy and Program Planning Division, Common Carrier Bureau. Adopted: April 3, 2000. by Order. (DA No. 00-1771). CCB
Public Notice Released: March 27, 2000. COMMON CARRIER BUREAU ANNOUNCES PUBLIC FORUM ON MCI WORLDCOM, INC. AND SPRINT CORPORATION, APPLICATIONS FOR TRANSFER OF CONTROL.CC Docket 99-333, contact: Claudia Fox or Susan Pie 1580; News media contact: Michael Balmoris 0253. (DA No. 00-672).
Statement of FCC Chairman Kennard Regarding U.S. Department of Justice Action on Proposed Worldcom-Sprint Merger. 6/27/00
SPRINT CORPORATION AND MCI WORLDCOM, INC. Adopted Modified Protective Order to provide that any confidential or proprietary documents submitted will be available for review. Action by Deputy Chief, Common Carrier Bureau. Adopted: April 11, 2000. by Order. (DA No. 00-827). CCB
SPRINT CORPORATION AND MCI WORLDCOM, INC. Issued Protective Order to ensure that the documents submitted by MCI WorldCom and Sprint are afforded adequate protection. By Order Adopting Protective Order. Dkt No.: CC-99-333. Action by Chief, Common Carrier Bureau. Adopted: February 2, 2000. (DA No. 00-186). CCB
STATEMENT OF FCC CHAIRMAN WILLIAM E. KENNARD ON PROPOSED MERGER OF MCI WORLDCOM, INC. AND SPRINT CORP. New media contact: Michael Balmoris 0253.
Apr 5 FCC Public Forum on MCI WorldCom Merger. Public Notice
- EPI Book, MCI WCOM's Sprint Towards Monopoly
- Court rules WorldCom can't have Sprint executive Nov 27, 2000 mercurycenter
- WorldCom To Fight EU Sept 29, 2000 cnn
- Update: WorldCom appeals EU block of Sprint merger Sept 29, 2000 computerworld
- WorldCom plans to appeal EU's block of merger with Sprint July 14, 2000 computerworld
- Sprint, WorldCom call off $120 billion merger July 14, 2000 cnet
- WorldCom may put itself up for sale July 14, 2000 cnet
- Ebbers blasts DOJ for blocking WorldCom/Sprint deal July 12, 2000 NWFusion
- Ebbers blasts DOJ for blocking WorldCom/Sprint deal July 12, 2000 computerworld
- WorldCom backs out of fixed wireless deal with Sprint July 10, 2000 computerworld
- WorldCom/Sprint Merger May Be A Goner - Update Newsbytes 6/27
- WCOM Sprint withdraw EU Merger Notice USAToday 6/27
- US to Block Sprint WCOM Merger The Standard 6/27
- Justice Department sues to block WorldCom-Sprint merger NandoTimes 6/27
- WorldCom-Sprint Doomed? CNNfn 6/27
- WorldCom, Sprint Remove Merger Application - AP 6/27
- WorldCom-Sprint Deal: A World Of Trouble ABC News 6/27
- WorldCom, Sprint Blocked CNNfn 6/27
- WorldCom & Sprint Withdraw Merger Proposal WasTech 6/27
- WorldCom may have to sell Internet unit C|NET 6/6
- WorldCom/Sprint Say EU Should Clear Merger InternetNews 5/31
- Hatch Urges FTC Caution In Time Warner/AOL Deal WashTech 5/22
- Feds reportedly may block WorldCom-Sprint Deal NAndoTimes 5/19
- DOJ Wants to Block MCI Sprint ZDNet 5/19
- DOJ may block WorldCom-Sprint merger C|NET 5/19
- MCI WorldCom/Sprint merger faces EU concerns NW Fusion 4/26
- CWA's web page on the MCI Worldcom/Sprint Merger
- Global unions ask EU to block MCI-Sprint merger c|net 4/17
- MCI wants sprint for its wireless data services NWFusion 4/7
- MCI-WorldCom, Sprint Filing Touts Merger Benefits Newsbytes 3/21
- DOJ preparing to block mci sprint merger NWFusion 3/17
- EU deepens MCI WorldCom/Sprint probe NWFusion 2/23
- FCC wants more facts before merger approval C|NET 12/17/99
- U.S. hires lawyer in MCI WorldCom, Sprint merger C|NET 12/10/99
- WorldCom deal held in regulatory limbo CNET 11/15/99
- MCI, Sprint optimistic despite report USA Today 11/15/99
- Congress: Consumers may suffer under MCI-Sprint C|NET 11/5/99
- Merger Hearings before the Senate Judiciary Committee Senate Website 11/5/99
- Senators wary of MCI-Sprint merger USAToday 11/5/99
- Will MCI WorldCom's buy of Sprint escape EU review? CNET 10/07
- FCC may dampen MCI-Sprint party USA Today 10/06
- Sprint mulls merger options C|NET 10/05
- Sprint in middle of bidding war USA Today 10/05
- MCI WorldCom buys Sprint for $129 billion C|NET 10/05
- FCC head: Not so fast USA Today 10/05
- MCI, Sprint Say Broadband Key Component of Merger Internet News 10/05